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Chapter IV 
 
Democratization Process in Indonesia Through 
Law 
 
In the previous Chapters we have come to realize, that the democratization 
process in Indonesia at the end of the 20th century went hand in hand with the legal 
changes needed for the establishment of a democratic society under the Rule of Law. 
 Although outsiders and even most students and activists would say, as if 
“nothing” has happened in the field of law, compared to the legal systems and legal 
institutions of European states and the United States established throughout the ages, 
whilst Indonesians are also dissatisfied and almost disillusioned with their 
contemporary legal situation and especially with the courts, police, public prosecutors 
and lawyers and civil servants in Indonesia1, the discovery that only in 3 (three) years 
time so many fundamental legal changes have been made, both with respect to the 
political parties, the general elections, the relationship between the highest political 
state-and-legal institutions, the change of the role and relationship of the Armed 
Forces and the Police, the radical change of the decentralization process and 
institutions, the protection of human rights and establishment of Human Rights Courts 
(apart from previously non-existing Commercial Courts) and so many new economic 
laws, which are not the subject of discussion in this book, cannot but surprise us of the 
speed in which all this could have happened, if no previous preparations were made, 
long before ex President Soeharto stepped down in 1998. 
 
I. Many more new laws are needed 
 
 True, there is still a lot to do, and perhaps even more than what already has 
been achieved in the last three years. 
 First, we will mention the need for: (a) the establishment of a clean, speedy, 
professional and independent judiciary, which will be able to (b) eradicate corruption, 
collation and nepotism and provide justice for all who bring their case to court. 
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Both processes may perhaps need more than a decade before we can observe tangible 
results. 
 Then we will have to establish the Third Amendments to the 1945 
Constitution, amongst others establishing (c) the Constitutional Court, (d) the 
Regional Representation Institution and (e) the Ombudsman.2 
 Simultaneously, we will have to promulgate many new laws concerning the 
Protection of Witnesses, the Right to Information, the Recruitment and Appointment 
of Civil Servants, Recruitment and Appointment of Judges, the Ombudsman, and 
many more laws and governmental regulations, as well as regional regulations for 
good governance and the good functioning of the administration, the judiciary and 
especially the courts, local councils and regional administration, the relationship 
between Central and Local Government, the relationship between the National 
Ombudsman and the Local or Regional Ombudsman, and many others. 
 This, as we can read in Chapter II of this book, will be endeavored in 2002, to 
be continued in 2003 and further. 
 The laws, which are planned by Parliament (DPR) for the near future, are as 
follows: 
 
1. Bill on proceedings to Establish Rules on Legislation 
2. Bill on the Institute of the Presidency 
3. Bill on Broadcasting 
4. Bill on he Formation of the Province of the Riau Islands 
5. Bill on Bank Loans 
6. Bill on the Protection of Children 
7. Bill on the National Education System 
8. Bill on Sports 
9. Bill on Doctor’s Practice 
10. Bill on the Protection of Witnesses and Victims 
11. Bill on the National Ombudsman 
12. Bill on the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia 
13. Bill on the Freedom to Obtain Public Information 
14. Bill on the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia 
15. Bill on the Protection of Indonesian Workers Overseas 
16. Bill on Tax Exemption 
17. Bill on State Secrets 
18. Bill on Liquidation of Banks 
19. Bill on the Rights of the Indonesian Parliament and members of Parliament 
20. Bill against Violence in the Home 
21. Bill against Discrimination, Ethnicity, Religion and Race 
22. Bill completing Law No. 58 of 1962 on Citizenship in the Republic of 
Indonesia 
23. Bill completing Law No. 23 of 1999 on the Bank of Indonesia 
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24. Bill on the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation 
25. Bill on the Profession of Defending Lawyers 
26. Bill on the Crime of Bribery 
27. Bill on Civil Law Proceedings 
28. Bill completing Law No. 1 of 1985 on Firms 
29. Bill completing Law No. 9 of 1992 on Immigration 
30. Bill of the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Eradication of all forms 
of Discrimination against Women through Legislation 
31. Bill on Investments 
32. Bill on the Principles on Procedure for Legislation (replacing the colonial law 
on Legal Procedure for Legislation) 
33. Bill on the Crime of Money laundering 
34. Bill on the Criminal Code 
35. Bill completing Law No. 4 of 1998 on Bankruptcy 
36. Bill improving Law. No. 5 of 1986 on the Administrative Court 
37. Bill improving Law No. 22 of 1997 on Narcotics 
38. Bill improving Law No. 1 of 1950 on Clemency 
39. Bill improving Law No. 15 of 1985 on Electric Power 
40. Bill improving Law No. 2 of 1999 on Political Parties 
41. Bill improving Law No. 3 of 1999 on the General Elections 
42. Bill improving Law No. 4 of 1999 on the Structure and Position of MPR, 
Parliament and DPRD 
43. Bill on Changes made to Law no. 9 of 1969 on the Establishment of 
Government Regulation replacing Law No. 2 of 1969 on State-owned 
Corporations into Law 
44. Bill Ratifying the International Convention on the Prohibition of the Sale of 
Women and Children 
45. Bill on the Ratification of the Convention on Refugees 
46. Bill on the Indonesian Armed Forces 
47. Bill on Changes to Law No. 12 of 1997 on Copyrights 
48. Bill on the Commission to Fight the Crime of Corruption 
49. Bill on the Ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombing 
50. Bill ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism 
51. Bill on State Finances 
52. Bill on the State Treasury 
53. Bill on the Audit of State Accounts 
54. Bill improving Law No. 1 of 1967 on the Principles of Mining 
55. Bill on the Development and Protection of Labor 
56. Bill on Changes to Law No. 23 of 1959 on the State of Emergency 
57. Bill ratifying the International Convention on ILO No. 81 
58. Bill ratifying the Treaty on Principles Regulating Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Utilization of Outer Space including the Moon and other 
Heavenly Bodies 
59. Bill on the National System of Science and Technology 
60. Bill on the Settlement of Industrial Dispute 
61. Bill on the Duty to Register Companies 
62. Bill on State Obligations 
63. Bill completing Law No. 2 of 1986 on the General Judicature 
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64. Bill on the Construction of Buildings 
65. (1)  Bill on the formation of the Regencies of Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya, and     
Tamiang in the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; 
(2) Bill on the formation of the Regencies of Katingan, Seruyan, Sukamara, 
Lamandau, Gunung Mas, Puang Pisau, Murung Raya, and Barito 
Timur in the territory of the Province of Central Kalimantan; 
(3) Bill on the formation of the Regency of Banyuasin in the territory of 
the province of South Sumatra; 
(4) Bill on the formation of the Regency of Panajam in the territory of the 
Province of East Kalimantan; 
(5) Bill on the formation of the Regency of the Talaud Islands in the 
territory of the province of North Sulawesi; 
(6) Bill on the formation of the Regency of Rote Ndao in the territory of 
the Province of East Nusa Tenggara; 
(7) Bill on the formation of the Regency of Parigi Moutong of the Province 
of Central Sulawesi; 
(8) Bill on the formation of the Regency of Mamase and the Town of 
Palopto in the territory of the Province of South Sulawesi; 
(9) Bill on the formation of the Regency of Pariaman in the territory of the 
Province of West Sumatra; 
(10) Bill on the formation of the Regency of Kota Bima in the  territory of 
the Province of West Nusa Tenggara. 
66. Bill on Poisonous and Dangerous Substances 
67. Bill on Changes to law No. 9 of 1985 on Fishery 
68. Bill on Plantations 
69. Bill on Changes to Law No. 11 of 1974 on Irrigation 
70. Bill on the Free Port of Batam 
71. Bill on Labour Arbitration 
72. Bill on Changes to Law No. 3 of 1992 on Social Insurance 
73. Bill on the Constitutional Court 
74. Bill on Changes to law No. 8 of 1995 on Capital Market 
75. Bill on Energy 
76. Bill on Heat from the Earth 
77. Bill on Changes to law No. 23 of 1992 on Health 
78. Bill on Changes to Law No. 5 of 1997 on Psychotropical 
      Substances 
79. Bill on the Board of the Tax Court 
80. Bill on the Posts 
 
 In 2004 we will have new General Elections., including the election of a new 
president and vice-president. Therefore the groundwork for this event, in order that 
they bring good results will have to start now, and will take most of 2003. 
 
II. Capacity Building and Institutional Reform 
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 Having all these new laws and legal institutions, albeit already quite a good 
achievement is worth nothing, if we don’t prepare the right personnel to do the job. 
Therefore, capacity building for the implementation of all aspects and at all levels of 
the new constitutional and legal institutions are a must, lest Indonesia will become a 
democratic state under the Rule of Law on paper only, and not in reality. 
 Now, all of us are aware of the fact that education takes a long time and that 
capacity building towards experienced professionals take even longer. Fortunately, 
although the number of such Indonesian experts are not great, but during the last 50 
years of our Independence, we have managed to have a number of old as well as 
younger experts in law, economics, technology, politics, sociology, communications, 
management, planning and other necessary professions. However, most of them 
outside the government or the judiciary and thus are not to be found in the legal or 
political institutions, which need them. 
 Therefore, the point is to find those honest, hardworking and expert 
professionals, and make them interested for the work within the judiciary, the 
governmental departments and other legal institutions. Unfortunately the salaries 
those experts enjoy at present are often ten times higher (if not more) than the 
Government is able to pay them, should they become ministers, director generals. 
High-ranking civil servants, judges or ombudsmen. 
 Whilst for the long term we will have to educate young experts and 
professionals, for the short term we will have to recruit law professors, businessmen 
and women, lawyers and private or corporate legal consultants or staff to do the job. 
Of course, they will only be interested if their salaries will be as good, or better than 
in their previous occupations. Hence the regulation on the salaries or remunerations of 
government officials should be very much improved, because without it no good 
expert would be interested to work for the government and judiciary, so that the state 
will have to be content with second rate, inexperienced and unprofessional or even 
immoral and unfair staff, officials and judges. 
 
III. Independence of the Judiciary 
 
 After so many new laws have been established, still it seems as if any attempt 
to correct injustice or to achieve justice by bringing the cases to court, meets with 
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almost insurmountable difficulties. Not only is the police to whom the cases are first 
reported often very reluctant to handle the case, especially when it concerns former 
dignitaries who are accused of corruptive practices, collusion and nepotism, unless 
some exorbitant sum of money is paid to them for “administrative costs”. Also the 
public prosecutors, or the registrars of the courts will only act, unless the case has 
been published in the media, so that they have been put in a difficult position, 
whenever they are not doing anything about the case. Even then, they and 
consequently the lawyers of the accused, more often than not use all kinds of legal 
tricks, based on very narrow and legalistic interpretations of the law, in order that the 
investigation process and the trial can be prolonged and made very difficult, to the 
advantage of the accused. When the case finally comes before the judge, the accused 
is very often acquitted, or too sick to be punished, or for one or other reason, is only 
sentenced with the lowest punishment, often corresponding with the days the accused 
was held in custody. 
 Whilst in some cases it may be true, that because of insufficient evidence the 
accused should be rightfully acquitted or because the accused was indeed not guilty, 
or cannot be found guilty, or was only accused by the press for political reasons to be 
guilty of a crime or legal offense (trial by the press), the common feeling of the legal 
society as well as the people at large is that the judicial process, starting from the 
investigation by the police up to the verdict of the judges and the execution of the 
verdict is unprofessional, biased and smacks of practices of bribery, corruption, 
collation and nepotism, or fear for reprisals by the accused or his/her family or 
political supporters. In short, the judiciary in Indonesia and the whole judicial process 
seems to be the biggest stumbling block towards justice and democratization, good 
governance, and the enforcement of the principle of Supremacy of (just) Law in 
Indonesia. 
 Therefore steps have been taken to improve the judicial system, such as: 
 
a. the establishment by law No. 39/1999 of the National Human Rights 
Commission; 
b. the establishment of new courts, such as the Commercial Court, and the 
Human Right Courts, outside the existing courts; 
c. the insistence that every verdict should have a full and complete report of the 
judges’ legal considerations which based the judge’s verdict; 
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d. the introduction of the possibility of a dissenting opinion of a judge,  when 
he/she is part of a group of three judges sitting on the case; 
e.  the appointment of non-career judges, i.e. usually law professors or well-
known practicing lawyers as judges; 
f. the renovation of the process of selecting and appointing judges through a “fit 
and proper test” procedure by parliament, instead of the ordinary 
administrative procedure of lengths of tenure of the judges, and appointment 
by the President; 
g. and other procedural changes and measures which have been introduced 
internally within the court offices, but also within the police-and-prosecutor’s 
quarters. 
 
The present Chief of Justice of the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) Prof. 
Dr. Bagir Manan, SH, MCL was also a non-career judge, and a constitutional law 
professor at Padjadjaran University (Bandung) and the Rector of the Bandung Islamic 
University in Bandung. For a number of years before he became rector, he served as 
the Director General of Law and Legislations at the Department (Ministry) of Law of 
Indonesia, so that apart from his legal knowledge, he has for years participated and 
headed the legislative process in Indonesia. 
 The reason for his election by parliament and appointment by the President 
was because the new Chief Justice is expected to bring fresh ideas and new and better 
improvements in the courts, both as to the administration of cases, procedures and 
selection of good judges, as well as to the actions to be taken against bad and/or 
corrupt judges and other judicial personnel, including practicing lawyers and 
registrars. 
 With the assistance of the World Bank and the Partnership for Good 
Governance Reformation, and especially in anticipation of the work of the newly 
established Human Rights Courts, a number of judges have been sent to Europe for 
training courses on many aspects towards a good functioning and independent 
judiciary. 
 In Indonesia the role, task and status of the judiciary is regulated in Law No. 
14 of 1970. Since 1970 it has been mandatory for Indonesian judges to delve and to 
discover the living values of the societies apart from applying the written law (See 
Article 1 Para 2 of Act No. 14 of 1970 on the Basic Competencies Judicial Power). 
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The elucidation of that article clarifies that in a transitional society recognizing the 
unwritten laws, like Indonesia, the judge acts as the discoverer and the formulator of 
the living values of the people. In other words, the independence of the judge is not 
absolute in Indonesia. It is limited by the conscience of the particular judge. 
 This appears to resemble the rule in Japanese Constitution, which according to 
Justice Shigemitzu Dando, determines in article 76 paragraph 3 that: 
 
 “All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall 
be bound by this Constitution and the laws”. 
 
The independence of the judiciary to a certain extent is recognized by the 1945 
Constitution, Article 24 of the Constitution declares, that: 
 
(1) Judicial Power shall be vested in the Supreme Court and subordinate courts as 
may be established by law; 
(2) The organization and competence of these courts shall be provided by law3. 
 
The elucidation of that article says more explicitly: 
 
 “The Judicial Power is an independent power, and free from the Executive, or 
Government. Hence, the status and functions of judges shall be guaranteed by 
law.” 
 
Twenty-five years later, the independence of the Indonesian Judiciary is elaborated 
under the general elucidation of paragraph 2 point 4 of Law No. 14 of 1970 on the 
Basic Competencies of the Judicial Power as follows: 
 
 The objective of “Judicial Power” as prescribed under Article 24 of the 1945 
Constitution is the Independence of the State in administering justice to 
enforce the law and justice based on the [national ideology, or] Pancasila, for 
the interest of the people and the implementation of the laws of the Republic 
of Indonesia, as a state under the rule of law (Rechtsstaat). 
 
Unfortunately, reality is often in contradiction with the rules. The Indonesian 
history recorded that under various regimes of government, i.e. both under Soekarno, 
Soeharto, Habibie or Abdurrachman Wahid that the meaning of the independence of 
the judiciary has been distorted either by judicial as well as extra judicial factors. It 
became known to the public at large that many judges and justices in Indonesia are 
neither impartial nor independent. Some were not impartial because of financial 
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factors and lucrative facilities, others were like that because they did not have the 
courage to go against the pressure of the authoritative Executive or the undemocratic 
Ruling Class. In the present situations, unfortunately many Indonesian courts 
eventually have lost their accountability4. 
 Therefore, the recent reformation movement in Indonesia reaffirmed that the 
judicial system must also be reformed and cleansed from corruptive judges, registrars 
as well as corruptive prosecutors and police officers. It is now a must that the so-
called “Mafia of Justice” must be eradicated as soon as possible. At the same time, the 
courts must be strengthened and restructured now and impartial judges and 
professional justices committed impartiality and fairness must be appointed as well as 
professional registrars and other judicial staff. Those efforts are sine qua non, not only 
to the recovery of the judicial and legal system as such, but also in support of the 
revival of the Indonesian economy as well as to the realization of good governance in 
the process of civil democratization5. 
 
IV. Steps of Judicial Reform 
 
The steps taken in the context of Judicial Reform are amongst others: 
 
(a) the reeducation of judges by the World Bank; through all kinds of seminars, 
training courses and even long distance discussions with judges from Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, and the Philippines; 
(b) the introduction of the institution of judicial review; 
(c) the recruitment and appointment of new non-career judges to bring “fresh 
blood” into the courts; 
(d) to strengthen the internal supervision upon the judges by appointing a Deputy 
Chief Justice for Supervision at the Supreme Court; 
(e) improvement of the method of judicial decision making; 
(f) improvement of the court management system; 
(g) improvement of the court administrative system; 
(h) the establishment of the National Ombudsman Commission; 
(i) and many more measures taken; 
 
Hereunder a few of the most important changes will be discussed. 
 
V. Judicial Review6  
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 One cannot deny that the independence of the judiciary will be more 
significant when the courts have the power of judicial review. By using this power the 
courts may review acts and regulations whenever those laws are in contradiction with 
the Constitution. At the same time, this power will become hollow when the judges 
are not independent and in favor of the ruling class or those in power. Again, 
experience taught us that the power of judicial review becomes ineffective during an 
emergency situation and political instability whereby martial law is declared in 
Indonesia under the former regimes. Under such situations the independent judiciary 
is at peril, because the chief administrator or the martial law is vested with broader 
emergency powers. Under such situation, those in power suspend the basic human 
rights by claiming that the actions have been in the state’s interest and for the people’s 
welfare7. 
 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Indonesia has never had the power of judicial 
review. It is true that this Court may nullify a government regulation and a provincial 
or local regulation, whenever it deems the regulation in contradiction with an act. 
Some people however are in favour of giving that power to the Supreme Court. This 
means that the Supreme Court should have the power to weigh whether an act is 
constitutional, or not. Despite of the pressure to change the status quo, there have 
been no hints that in the near future the power of reviewing the acts will be vested to 
the Supreme Court of Indonesia. Some even urge that a Special Committee in the 
People’s Representative assembly (MPR) should be commissioned to review the acts. 
Others argue that a Constitutional Court has to be incepted for that purpose. 
 Evidently, when the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat  (People’s Consultative 
Assembly of Indonesia) convened in August last year, the majority of the members 
insisted on creating a Parliamentary Commission of Constitution. Many however, 
were of the opinion that the political interest will make such a Commission biased. 
We must wait what will happen next in the immediate Annual Convention this year 
(2020). 
 In the meantime, compared to their government officials in Indonesia, 
Indonesian judges have better emoluments. Yet, compared to their colleagues in the 
neighbouring countries, the judges receive much lower salaries. Moreover, the 
Indonesian judges belong to the civil service with special high status as pejabat 
Negara, or “state functionaries”. On the contrary, in many other countries, judges are 
judicial servants. Therefore two branches of Indonesian Government control them. 
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Judicially, the Supreme Court controls their action and administratively, the Justice 
Department supervises their performance. In addition, the budget of the judiciary is 
prepared by the Justice Department too. Therefore, it has been an aphoristic phrase in 
Indonesia that “the brains of the judges are controlled by the Supreme Court, but the 
stomach by the Justice Department.” 
 It is only natural if many of the opinion that the Supreme Court should 
judicially and administratively supervise the courts. Consequently, the judges should 
become judicial servants only and more independent. Fortunately, the Indonesian 
Government realized the negative impact of the situation and it has been decided 
recently, that starting from the year 1999, the Justice Department will gradually 
transfer its administrative supervision of judges to the Supreme Court in five years 
time. 
 
VI. The administrative and Procedural Supervision 
of Courts by the Ombudsman 
 
 Last but not least, the courts now are under the scrutiny of an independent 
institution called the Komisi Ombudsman Nasional, or the National Ombudsman 
Commission. Almost all Ombudsmen, in the world eventhough vested with broad 
powers, more often than not use the “power of persuasion”. 8  This has been the 
practice due to the fact that their recommendations are not legally biding. As Donald 
C. Rowat states that Ombudsman is no more than the Legislature’s watchdog. It may 
bark, but not bite. 9 So much more, the Ombudsman of Indonesia, which at present is 
a new institution and not yet widely known, including in judicial and governmental 
circles. 
 Nonetheless, in the first year of its existence (2000), the Commission received 
not less than 1000 letters of grievance. The greater part of which (37%) is about the 
courts of all kinds and tiers. In the following year (2001), the complaints about the 
judiciary were still dominating and compared to the previous year, it increased by 8 %. 
This means that the majority of grievance about the judiciary is 45 % of all complaints. 
Chief Ombudsman Antonius Sujata concluded that these facts reflect “none other than 
how the Judiciary in Indonesia has failed to perform its duties in providing justice for 
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all. In short, the malpractices conducted by the courts have reached the point being 
intolerable.”10 He added, that: 
 
 “[t}he impartial judges and justices in Indonesia apparently are now aware, 
that they cannot use the “independence of judiciary” as the shield or weapon 
for defence against public scrutiny or public charge that they are “selling” their 
judgments and rulings. They are aware that there is a new zealous watcher in 
Indonesia called the National Ombudsman Commission.” 
 
Actually, there are many who want to see a strong independent body to control 
the court system. Such institutions in some Anglo American countries are known as 
“Judicial Council” with the powers and jurisdictions stronger and broader than those 
of the Ombudsman, except in Sweden, Finland, and the State of Alaska in the United 
States. 
 The Government and the judiciary seems somewhat reluctant to response to 
the aspiration of many people previously mentioned. Instead, the Chief Justice of 
Indonesia created an internal institution for judicial supervision with the title of 
“Deputy Chief Justice for Supervision”. A lady Justice was inaugurated to fill this 
position last year (2110). She is vested with the authority to control the behavior and 
performance of all judges as well as the court system in Indonesian and hence works 
in close cooperation with the National Ombudsman Commission, investigating the 
complaint forwarded together by the Ombudsman Commission and acting, if found 
relevant, upon its recommendations. Many are of the opinion, however, that her role 
and functions apparently will not be very independent; as she will be supervising her 
own colleagues. As a result, a very independent and impatient external judicial 
supervisor is needed badly. 
 One of the other issues about how to make the public more involved in 
scrutinizing the courts is the demand for being more transparent in the making of 
court judgments. Indonesia has never published dissenting opinions of judges. 
Therefore, many argue (amongst others one of the writers of this book, Prof. Dr. 
Sunaryati Hartono, S.H., who refused to be appointed as one of the ad hoc 
Commercial Court Judges, because at that time no dissenting opinion was tolerated, 
let alone published, that this court tradition must be ended and the Anglophone 
countries’ tradition and practice of courts must be followed. The new rule which has 
now been introduced means that not only the parties, but also the public will know the 
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development and considerations of making court judgments, 11 so that it becomes 
clearer who the good judges are, and who aren’t.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
                                                           
1 See for instance President’s Megawati Soekarnoputri’s statement, that she inherited a “waste basket” 
of administration. 
 
2 See J. Rammelink, Past, Present and Future of the ‘Hoge Raad der Nederlanden’ lecture presented at 
the office of His Excellency Mr. Singgih, SH, Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia (A,hem” 
Gouda Quint B.V., 1992). 
 
3 “Undang-Undang Forum Previlegiatum” (UU No. 22 Drt. Th. 1951), Kitab Himpunan Perundang-
Undangan Negara Republik Indonesia (ed. and trans. by K.H. Husin), 3 vol., Jakarta, Kementrian 
Penerangan RI, 1957. 
  
4 Antonius Sujata and RM Surachman, “The Ombudsman and the Judicial System”, paper submitted to 
the 5th Asian Ombudsman Association Conference, Manila, the Philippines, 2000, p. 4. 
 
5 The dialogue between the National Ombudsman Commission and the Senior Legal Advisor of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Commission Office on 21st June 2000: see also Antonius 
Sujata and RM Surachman, “The Ombudsman and the Judicial System”, p. 5. 
  
6 The term judicial review is not used to mean: “The form of appeal from an administrative body to the 
courts for review of either the findings of fact, or of law, or of both or “The power of courts to review 
decisions of another department or level of government (see Black’s Law Dictionary, op. cit. p. 849), 
but specifically used in the sense that “the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) should have the power 
to review the decisions of the Executive or of lower judges against the norms of the Constitution”. 
  
7 Haleem, passim, specifically p. 29 referring to Carl J. Friedrich and Guy J. Pauker. 
  
8 Sheila Guttehrer explained to the audience of the informal session in a two-day Workshop on Local 
Ombudsman (Den Pasar, Bali, 21-22 February 2002). 
 
9  Office of the Federal Ombudsman (Kingdom of Belgium), Annual Report 1997, p. 15. 
 
10 See Antonius Sujata and RM Surachman, “The Ombudsman and the Judicial System” in Antonius 
Sujata dan RM Surachman, “Ombudsman Indonesia di tengah Ombudsman Internasional”, Jakarta, 
Komisi Ombudsman Nasional, 2002. 
 
11  Cf. Tim Peneliti 2001, Reposisi Lembaga Tinggi Negara, kerjasama dengan Puslitbang 
Kemasyarakatan dan Kebudayaan LIPI dengan Hans Seidel Foundation, Jakarta, Maret 2001, h. 127. 
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